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This paper presents a study of backward and forward patent citations in patents granted to 
firms and institutions in the Netherlands by the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO). The study establishes different patterns of patent citation in recent Dutch patents 
belonging to different industrial classes. We run our model in the set of backward citations 
made in Dutch applicants’ patents during 1996-2006 and in the set of forward citations to 
patents issued to firms and organizations in the Netherlands during 1993-2006. We compare 
the patterns of knowledge utilization (represented by backward patent citations) and 
knowledge dissemination (represented by forward patent citations) and obtain evidence of 
inter- or intra-firm and inter- or intra-industry knowledge spillovers. In the context of 
effective competition and innovation policies we advocate for paying special attention to 
industry specifics when designing policy programs and measures directed at stimulating R&D 
cooperation and knowledge spillovers. We present evidence that policies for promoting better 
knowledge exchange among firms should also distinguish between the measures for 
promoting the inward and the outward knowledge flows for companies in the Netherlands. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The present research aims at investigating knowledge spillovers in firms and 
institutions in the Netherlands by examining their patent citation behavior.  There 
are no doubts about the importance of knowledge spillovers for economic growth.  
Driven by this consideration, governments and public policy institutions show a 
considerable interest in developing effective policy measures to stimulate 
technological change, and to give an extra impulse for the development of the 
economy. An active technology policy in developed economies usually contains 
different policy instruments. For example: public R&D funding, intellectual 
property rights protection mechanisms, fiscal policy measures to stimulate R&D, 
etc. 
 
In the contemporary knowledge and technology driven economy, the role of 
knowledge exchange and dissemination is often as important as, for example, the 
role of direct investment.  First, knowledge spillovers allow a better penetration and 
diffusion of innovation among economic agents increasing their competitiveness 
through lower costs of obtaining a new technology.  Second, knowledge spillovers 
stimulate cooperation in R&D by creating additional incentives for innovators to try 
to internalize knowledge flows and to pool the resources in joint research efforts.  
Both of these types of effects eventually result in faster technological progress and 
economic growth in the country. 
 
The innovating firms rely on their intangible assets as a source of their market value 
and competitive position. Therefore, the flow of knowledge among such firms is not 
only a process of pure information sharing, but also contributes to the 
increase/decrease of their market value, competitive and economic efficiency. In the 
contemporary knowledge and technology driven economy, the role of knowledge 
exchange and dissemination is often as important as, for example, the role of direct 
investment.  
 
We can consider the notion of knowledge spillovers in several ways. According to 
De Bondt (1996), the concept of a „knowledge spillover‟ is specified as an 
„involuntary leakage or voluntary exchange‟ of technological knowledge. In the 
study of Nieuwenhuijsen and van Stel (2003), knowledge spillovers are described as 3 
 
 
a process in which one economic agent benefits from R&D efforts of another 
economic agent without any tangible remuneration. 
 
When the firm decides to apply for a patent, it recognizes the potential value of the 
invention (Jaffe et al., 1993). Of course, this does not mean that non-patented 
knowledge is worthless, but we should advocate that the patented knowledge is the 
one most likely to be commercialized. Furthermore, a patent contains the 
information verified and submitted afterwards to a controlling body. Thus, a patent 
citation is certified evidence of previous knowledge used by the inventor(s), who 
obtain(s) a given patent. This previous knowledge, eventually, comes from the same 
patented domain. Hence, we conclude that a patent citation determines a spillover of 
one protected (i.e., recognized as potentially valuable) knowledge pool to another. 
 
Gandal and Scotchmer (1993) advocate that it is more efficient to delegate research 
efforts to the agent with the highest ability by means of a Research Joint Venture 
(RJV) and this will lead to better private and social results. In the framework of 
d‟Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), the study of Lukach and Plasmans (2000) 
investigated the optimal R&D and production strategies of firms that have different 
capabilities in research and production, which is very often the case in international 
markets. It concludes that in RJVs the firm with a lower marginal cost of R&D 
conducts by far the larger part of joint R&D.  This finding provides additional 
evidence of delegation, initially described by Gandal and Scotchmer.  Moreover, 
under conditions of greater knowledge spillovers, the creation of an RJV leads to an 
improved social welfare position. 
 
Bernstein and Nadiri (1988) state that the existence of significant knowledge 
spillovers plays an important role in determining the effectiveness of fiscal policy 
measures on R&D investment, also for competition policy regarding RJVs. 
 
By stimulating firms to cooperate in R&D, the regulator shifts the mode of their 
R&D and production behavior from a competitive to a less competitive position 
with a higher value of the welfare function. For example, the profit maximizing 
firms in industries with weak knowledge spillovers tend to compete in R&D, rather 
than to cooperate. Thus, if the regulator wants to induce R&D cooperation, it should 
come up with some tangible way to stimulate these firms‟ cooperation. On the other 
hand, in conditions with strong knowledge spillovers, market forces provide a 4 
 
 
certain stimulus for companies to cooperate in research and thus the regulator can 
save resources by letting „nature do its job‟. If we consider the regulator‟s task in 
stimulating the economic growth by inducing R&D cooperation, it becomes clear 
that the correct assessment of the knowledge spillovers‟ environment can be one of 
the important elements for the success of such regulating policy. 
 
The study of patent citations has its own limitations. Advantages and disadvantages 
of using patent citations data are extensively discussed by Griliches (1990) and Jaffe 
et al. (1993). Patent citations are linked to the patenting procedure itself. They 
capture only the knowledge flows, which occur between patented „pieces‟ of 
innovation, thus underestimating the actual extent of knowledge spillovers. Other 
means of knowledge transfer are not captured by patent citations, such as: purchase 
of capital goods with embodied technologies, employment of engineers and other 
creative staff from other firms and institutions, voluntary knowledge exchange at 
conferences and in scientific publications. Although we admit the importance of 
other non-patent-citation ways of knowledge exchange, only a patent citation can be 
considered as the representation of such an exchange. Patent information is better 
protected than other forms of innovative information, because it clearly indicates the 
ownership over a particular piece of knowledge, which is protected by law. 
 
Tijssen (2001) investigated the citations of granted USPTO patents relating to 
Dutch-authored research papers in order to ascertain the impact of Dutch-authored 
innovations on other patented knowledge.  An extensive study of Verspagen (1997) 
analyses patent citations data in relation to the productivity growth analysis for a 
cross-country, cross-sectional sample. He advocates that patent citations provide a 
measure for knowledge spillovers, which is different from other conventional 
measures. In addition, Verspagen (1999) investigated the impact of large Dutch 
companies on domestic knowledge diffusion in the Netherlands by studying patent-
to-patent citations data, provided by the EPO. This study employed a network 
analysis to analyze the place of Dutch multinationals in the domestic technology 
infrastructure. 
 
In their contribution to the publication of The National Innovation System of 
Belgium, Capron and Cincera (2000) studied the technological performance of 
Belgian companies using international patent and scientific-publication information 
as output indicators of technological and innovation activity from 1980 to 1996. 5 
 
 
This study aimed to determine the areas of comparative technological advantage 
and the regional distribution of innovative efforts in Belgium. 
 
The study of Duguet and MacGarvie (2003), based on the results of a Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS) in France, shows that backward citations are correlated 
with firms‟ R&D and innovation activities, while forward citations are correlated 
with firms‟ answers on questions about their actions in disseminating their 
knowledge. Thus, even though backward and forward knowledge citations 
contribute to knowledge spillovers in a similar manner, the underlying economic 
rationales of these two processes differ. 
 
In this paper we consider two different types of citations: backward (patent) 
citations and forward (patent) citations. Backward citations are citations listed in a 
particular patent and represent the technological knowledge acquired by the 
inventor. Forward citations occur when a particular patent gets cited representing in 
this way the diffusion of knowledge encapsulated in this patent. 
 
We construct two separate datasets for backward and forward citations that give us 
an opportunity to compare the industrial patterns of knowledge utilization 
(represented by backward citations) and knowledge dissemination (represented by 
forward citations). The backward citations data yield a finally time-invariant picture 
of knowledge flows into the Netherlands via patent citations made by the innovating 
firms in the Netherlands between 1996 and 2006. The forward citations data contain 
all citations received by the patents of the firms in the Netherlands granted between 
1993 and 2006. 
  
Here we should point out one important assumption we made in order to analyze the 
forward citations data. Patents granted to firms in the Netherlands between 1993 
and 2006 continue to receive citations as we speak. The forward citations dataset in 
this study is a snap-shot picture of a dynamic process as it was by the end of 2006. 
Therefore we do not attempt to derive any time-related implications for knowledge 
dissemination patterns in this paper. Yet it is rational to assume that the industrial 
structure of citations is persistent. Thus, we depart from the assumption that the 
probability that a particular patent will become cited by a patent from a particular 
industry remains the same over time. Therefore, we can then analyze the industrial 




In this paper we build upon the studies of Lukach and Plasmans (2003) and (2005), 
which estimated the likelihood of a citation appearing in a particular industry using 
the data contained in the patents issued to corporate applicants in Belgium. Their 
method relies on a comparative analysis of the data and a qualitative response 
variable analysis.  
 
The main goal of this study is to uncover different patterns of backward and forward 
citations in recent patents belonging to different industrial classes in the 
Netherlands. We observe that knowledge utilization (backward citation patterns) in 
patents obtained in, for example,  the Electric Machines excl. Electronics industry 
can be described as primarily closed intra-firm exchange. Yet when looking at 
knowledge dissemination (being cited in forward citations), we see that knowledge 
exchange tends to be more inter-firm, thus indicating the relative strategic 
importance of knowledge generated by the firms in this sector in the Netherlands. 
The opposite picture is observed in the Computers and Office Machines industry. 
Dutch firms in this sector tend to rely more on the knowledge created by other 
firms, while own innovations are more likely to be further disseminated inside the 
same company. 
 
Thus, the citations data in our study provide evidence of inter- or intra-firm and 
inter- or intra-industry knowledge spillovers which are very industry specific and 
are different for processes of knowledge utilization and knowledge dissemination. 
Hence, the market environment factors originating in knowledge spillovers play 
their role in determining firms‟ incentives to cooperate in innovation. This asks for 
adopting differentiated approaches by the regulator. 
 
In the context of developing effective competition and innovation policies we 
advocate for taking industry specifics of knowledge utilization and dissemination 
into account. This in particular concerns designing policy measures directed at 
stimulating R&D cooperation and knowledge spillovers. From the industrial 
economic literature we know that knowledge flows among firms and industries 
create natural incentives which induce firms‟ cooperation. If such incentives are 
strong, it is possible to consider a less intrusive approach to STI policy and rely on 
the „natural‟ tendencies towards cooperation and maybe stimulate only the most 
interesting joint R&D projects and/or alliances. Therefore, using the market 7 
 
 
incentives in combination with policy interventions can be a more efficient way to 
achieve the policy objectives whether it is the higher R&D investment or better 
knowledge diffusion in the economy. 
 
2. The Data 
 
Our primary source of information lies in „patent citation pairs‟. This kind of data 
supplies a good opportunity to study knowledge flows, indicated by the citation 
references in the patent application. For example, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1998) and 
Verspagen (1999) conducted analyses of different patent citation datasets using 
different methodologies: econometric probit(logit)-type models, technological 
proximity matrices, and network analysis. 
 
We run our model in the set of backward citations made in applicants‟ patents in the 
Netherlands during 1996-2006 and the set of forward citations received by the 
patents of firms and organizations in the Netherlands granted during 1993-2006. In 
the primary dataset each line represents a single patent citation accompanied by 
several descriptive characteristics, which are: the patent number, the applicant‟s 
name, the applicant‟s country, the year in which the patent was granted, and the 
patent‟s class according to the International Patent Classification (IPC).  
 
In addition to that, we use the IPC-ISIC (ISIC – the International Standard Industrial 
Classification of all economic activities of the United Nations) concordance table 
compiled by Verspagen et al. (1994) to transform the IPC classes into more 
business-oriented groups indicated in the ISIC (compatible with the familiar NACE 
classification). 
 
The source for the backward citations dataset is a collection of all patents granted by 
the USPTO to USPTO-applicants in the Netherlands during the period between 
1996 and 2006. It contains 16228 patents, which produce 104262 initial backward 
patent-to-patent citations. For the forward citations analysis we depart from the 
collection of 91040 forward citations referring to the USPTO-patents in the 



























Figure 1. The Backward Citations Time Lag Structure. 
 
We start by considering the time-related features of the backward citation data. 
Based on the time lag between citing and cited patents, we can derive the 
implications about the time structure of knowledge spillovers. Figure 1 illustrates 
the distribution of patents cited by firms in the Netherlands across different years. 
The basic shape of the distribution is very much like the shape of the estimated 
citation frequency functions obtained by Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1998). The figure 
shows that recent patents (relative to the date of the citing patent) are more likely to 
be cited than the older ones. As we already mentioned above, the time-related 
features of forward citations are not relevant for this study and thus omitted.  
 
Table 1 presents all industries according to their ISIC, accompanied by the 









3850  Instruments  13.83 
3832  Electronics  12.36 
3510+3520  Chemistry, except pharmacy  12.36 
3820  Other machinery  12.04 
3825  Computers & office machines  9.53 
3522  Pharmacy  7.84 
3810  Metal products, ex. machines  7.09 
3830  Electric mach., ex. electronics  5.25 
3400  Paper, printing and publishing  5.17 
3100  Food, beverages, tobacco  3.65 
3900  Other industrial products  3.07 
3600  Stone, clay and glass products  1.83 
3843  Motor vehicles  1.14 
5000  Building and construction  1.03 
3200  Textiles, clothes, etc.  1.00 
3300  Wood and furniture  0.69 
3720  Non ferrous basic metals  0.39 
3530+3540  Oil refining  0.33 
3550+3560  Rubber and plastic products  0.31 
3710  Ferrous basic metals  0.31 
3840  Other transport  0.30 
1000  Agriculture  0.26 
3841  Shipbuilding  0.15 
3845  Aerospace  0.06 
4000  Utilities  0.01 
Table 1. Backward Citation Percentages in Dutch Patents in different Industries. 
 
There are nine major industries which account for the largest part (85%) of all 
citations considered: 3850 (Instruments), 3832 (Electronics), 3510+3520 
(Chemistry excluding Pharmacy), 3820 (Other Machinery), 3825 (Computers and 10 
 
 
Office Machines), 3522 (Pharmacy), 3810 (Metal Products excluding Machines), 
3830 (Electronic Machines, excluding Electronics), and 3400 (Paper, Printing and 
Publishing). 
 




3820  Other machinery  14,75 
3510+3520  Chemistry, except pharmacy  14,53 
3522  Pharmacy  12,65 
3850  Instruments  11,90 
3832  Electronics  11,56 
3810  Metal products, ex. machines  7,03 
3100  Food, beverages, tobacco  5,32 
3825  Computers & office machines  4,92 
3400  Paper, printing and publishing  4,17 
3830  Electric mach., ex. electronics  3,86 
3900  Other industrial products  2,87 
3600  Stone, clay and glass products  1,61 
3300  Wood and furniture  0,88 
3843  Motor vehicles  0,85 
3200  Textiles, clothes, etc.  0,70 
5000  Building and construction  0,69 
3840  Other transport  0,48 
3550+3560  Rubber and plastic products  0,36 
3710  Ferrous basic metals  0,30 
3720  Non ferrous basic metals  0,25 
3530+3540  Oil refining  0,10 
1000  Agriculture  0,09 
3841  Shipbuilding  0,07 
3845  Aerospace  0,04 
4000  Utilities  0,02 




Correspondingly, Table 2 presents the forward patent citation frequencies in 
different industries from the pooled sample. As we can see all but one „top-ten‟ 
industries from the backward citations table are also occupying the top-ten positions 
in the forward citations frequency ranking. Only sector 3400 (Paper, Printing and 
Publishing) is now well below 5%, so that this industry will not be considered 
further and, for further modeling, we choose the same lists of eight key industries 
for the backward and forward citations datasets (since also sector 3100 (Food, 
beverages, and tobacco) remains well below 5% in the backward citations set in 
Table 1 so that the eight sectors represent 80.3 % of backward USPTO citations of 
and 81.2 % of forward USPTO citations to firms and organizations in the 
Netherlands).
2    
 
3. Model and Estimations 
 
Previous researchers‟ experience (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1998) shows that patent 
citations data are best to be analyzed using a binary choice qualitative response 
model. The occurrence of a citation with particular attributes represents a binary 
event (occurrence or not), of which it is possible to estimate the probability of 
occurrence. 
 
We analyze one particular kind of event, which takes place as a patent citation 
occurs. The event is „the citation occurs in the citing patent belonging to the 
particular industry class‟. We study the estimated probability of this event and its 
relationship with a set of independent variables in order to derive analytical 
implications about the inter- and intra-industry/firm structure of knowledge 
spillovers. Our dependent variable is an indicator, which has value 1 if the citation 
(either backward or forward) occurs in the patent of a given particular industry, and 
equals 0 otherwise. We have chosen patents from the eight major industries 
(occupying the first eight places in Table 1) to be analyzed by the model. 
                                                 
 
2Note that industry 3830 (Electronic Machines, excluding Electronics) is well below 
the 5% ceiling in the forward citations Table 2, but since the eight sectors including 
Electronic Machines, excluding Electronics are more representative for the forward 
citations than for the backward citations we leave this sector in the list of eight 




The list of explanatory variables consists of: 
 
- an indicator that the patent citation has occurred between patents, owned by the 
same firm or institution (equals 1 if both citing and cited patents belong to the same 
firm, and equals 0 otherwise); it is represented by the dummy variable SameFirm; 
- a „concordance weighted‟ indicator that the citation has occurred between patents, 
belonging to the same ISIC-industry class (real number between 0 and 1 inclusive); 
it is represented by the variable SameIndustry; 
- the year when the citing patent was issued represented by the variable Year; 
- the value of a citation lag (i.e. the time difference between citing and cited patents, 
expressed in years); it is represented by the variable CitationLag. 
 
We use the concordance percentage from the MERIT Concordance Table (the share 
of the patents in each IPC class assigned to the corresponding ISIC category; see 
Verspagen et al. (1994) to weigh the indicator variable for the citation occurred. For 
example, if two patents belong to the same industry, we calculate the product of 
their concordance percentages, obtaining in this way the measure of the „citation 
occurrence‟ in this particular industry. The concordance percentage is the relative 
frequency of patents in the particular IPC class falling into a given ISIC class, thus 
their product in the citation pair represents a certain likelihood measure of the patent 
citation itself to fall into this ISIC class. Moreover, the usage of concordance 
percentages leads to the expansion of the sample due to the fact that one IPC class 
may fall into several industries with different weights. 
 
It is possible to estimate several different specifications of the binary choice model: 
probit, logit or log-log and complementary log-log (Long, 1997). Based on our 
experience of the Belgian study and the fact that in each estimate the dependent 
variable much more often takes up zero values than ones, we have chosen the 
complementary log-log distribution as the basis for our model (see Appendix). The 
complementary log-log distribution is asymmetric. The distribution of our 
dependent variable is also likely to be asymmetric, because the number of citations 
occurring in a certain industry (corresponding to non-zero elements in the sample) is 
certainly expected to be much smaller than the number of citations in other 




Distributions of the independent variables are asymmetric too. As we return to the 
graph (Figure 1) for the time lag variable, we see that it is quite asymmetric with 
more weight falling on the more recently granted cited patents. In our binary 
variables (such as the event indicator and the variable SameFirm) too, we see that 
zero values are more numerous than non-zero ones. This is also true for the non-
binary variable SameIndustry in both backward and forward citations datasets. 
 
There are several notes to be made about interpretation of the results. Among the 
explanatory variables in our model we have one binary variable, two integer 
variables, and one coming from the real numbers set. We immediately substitute the 
estimated coefficients by the corresponding slopes or marginal effects (see 
Appendix). The estimation results from the backward citations dataset are presented 
in Table 3 and from the forward citations dataset in Table 4 correspondingly. 
 
Code  Industry  SameFirm  SameIndustry  Cit.Lag  Year 











3810  Metal products, 










3825  Computers & 





3830  Electric mach., ex. 
electronics  0.05175
***  0.10911
***  0.00008  -0.00017
*** 










Table 3. Estimated complementary log-log Marginal Effects in the Backward Citations 
Dataset (
*** indicates 1% statistical significance, 
** corresponds to 5 %, and 
* to 10%) .
 
 
As we can see from Tables 3 and 4 both the backward and forward citation 
probability regressions provide the majority of slopes with a high degree of 14 
 
 
statistical significance. The slopes of variables SameFirm and SameIndustry will be 
discussed further below, while here we will concentrate our attention on the time-
related independent variables (only backward citation regressions are analyzed). 
 
The estimated slopes in the backward citations dataset show that older patents are 
more likely to be cited in the „Chemistry, excl. Pharmacy‟, „Pharmacy‟, „Other 
Machinery‟, and the „Metal Products, excl. Machines‟ industries. In the 
„Instruments‟, „Computers and Office Machines‟, „Electronics‟, and „Electric 
Machines excl. Electronics‟ industries it is more likely that a more recent patent 
receives a citation. 
 
Remarkably, all of the industries studied do not show a tendency towards making 
more citations in the patents granted in later years. Indeed, we expect that as more 
patent information resources become available to inventors and applicants, the 
number of citations made in a new patent application will increase. Our estimation 
does not provide support for this assumption. In all industries considered we 
observe negative slope coefficients indicating that newer patents are not likely to 
make more citations than older ones.  
 
Code  Industry  SameFirm  SameIndustry  Cit.Lag  Year 
3510+3520  Chemistry, 









3810  Metal products, 















3830  Electric mach., 















Table 4. Estimated complementary log-log Marginal Effects in the Forward Citations 
Dataset (
*** indicates 1% statistical significance, 
** corresponds to 5 %, and 









Computers and office 
machines





















Figure 2. Positioning of Industries with Relation to Intra-firm and Intra-industry 
Knowledge Utilization Flows (Backward Citations Data). 
 
To obtain a better view on general results of modeling the knowledge spillovers in 
the knowledge utilization and the knowledge dissemination contexts, we use a map 
of relative positions for particular industries with relation to the likelihood of intra-
firm and intra-industry citation. Figures 2 and 3 are constructed in two dimensions, 
where on the horizontal axis we plot the slope coefficient for the SameFirm dummy 
and on the vertical axis is the slope coefficient for the SameIndustry variable. Such 
an arrangement is based on the interpretation of the obtained slope coefficients. A 
slope coefficient in our model describes the change in the probability of a patent 





























Figure 3. Positioning of Industries with Relation to Intra-firm and Intra-industry 
Knowledge Dissemination Flows (Forward Citations Data). 
 
Thus, a pair of such coefficients for a particular industry points at its unique 
position on the map relative to other industries and the origin, which can be 
interpreted in the following manner. The bottom-left quadrant of the map contains 
industries, which are more inclined towards inter-firm and inter-industry knowledge 
spillovers (the probability of citation decreases for patents belonging to the same 
firm and industry class). We can call such industries „open‟. On the opposite, the 
top-right quadrant of the map contains more „closed‟ industries, which favor intra-
firm and intra-industry citation (the citation is more likely if the patent pair comes 
from the same industry and is owned by the same firm). The bottom-right quadrant 
combines a higher likelihood of inter-industry, but intra-firm spillovers. And the 




Following the discussion in Section 2 on specifics of Dutch patent citations data, we 
can also interpret the industry‟s openness towards inter-firm spillovers as openness 
towards more international knowledge flows. In Figures 2 and 3 we see that 
different major industries occupy positions in different quadrants.  
 
Now we consider each industry‟s position in both knowledge utilization and 
knowledge dissemination maps. The quadrant for „open‟ industries in terms of 
knowledge utilization contains only one industry, the „Other Machinery‟. This 
industry is also open when it comes to knowledge dissemination patterns. The 
„Other Machinery‟ sector seems likely to show more inter-firm (although the 
coefficient is not statistically significant) and definitely more inter-industry 
knowledge flows.  
 
If we observe results further, we see that the „Electric Machines excluding 
Electronics‟ industry exhibits the closed industry‟s knowledge utilization patterns. 
This implies that the knowledge utilization processes in this industry favors more 
intra-firm and intra-industry patterns. Yet the knowledge created in this industry is 
likely to be used differently. In the knowledge dissemination map we see that 
patents in the „Electric Machines excluding Electronics‟ industry are more likely to 
be patented by other firms, which makes this industry more open and also makes it 
similar to the „Electronics‟ industry. In the „Electronics‟ industry the patterns of 
backward and forward citations are similar and favor inter-firm but intra-industry 
knowledge flows. 
 
The „Computers and Office Machines‟ and „Instruments‟ industries are open for 
inter-firm knowledge flows, and less inclined towards using the knowledge from 
other industries. They also both exhibit the same change in patent citation behavior 
when it comes to knowledge dissemination. The knowledge generated by the firms 
in these sectors is more likely to be used inside the same company and still inside 
the same industry. 
 
The „Chemistry, excluding Pharmacy‟, „Pharmacy‟, and the „Metal Products 
excluding Machines‟ industries exhibit greater openness for inter-industry 
knowledge spillovers, but are less inclined to cite the knowledge of other firms. The 
same patterns of knowledge flows persist in the forward citations data for 18 
 
 
„Pharmacy‟ (although the SameFirm coefficient is not statistically significant) and 
„Metal Products excluding Machines‟. The „Chemistry excluding Pharmacy‟ 
industry shows different patterns for outbound knowledge flows (by the means of 
forward citations) by being more open towards inter-firm knowledge flows. 
 
 
4. Conclusions and Policy Discussion 
 
The objective of this study was to investigate the patenting and patent citation 
behavior of firms and institutions in a small open economy. We based the study on 
patent behavior of firms and institutions in the Netherlands using the 1996-2006 
backward and 1993-2006 forward patent citations data from the USPTO. The 
attention of this study was concentrated on the patent citations of patent applicants 
related to firms and organizations in the Netherlands using binary response variable 
models. The results of the data analysis and estimations can be summarized as 
follows. 
 
A preliminary analysis has shown that the majority of USPTO patent citations occur 
in a limited number of main industries. 
 
The estimated probability of a patent citation calculated given a particular set of 
factors (SameFirm dummy and SameIndustry variable, time lag between the citing 
and the cited patents, the year in which the citing patent was issued) can be used as 
an efficient measure of strength of knowledge spillovers in a certain industry, and 
can be applied for various competitive behavioral models.  
 
The industrial sectors analyzed exhibit different patterns of patent citation and the 
knowledge spillovers associated with them. These patterns are very industry-
specific; we did not study however their possible correlation with the degree of 
foreign participation and/or ownership. 
 
We observe that the patented knowledge utilization (backward citation patterns) in 
the „Electronics‟ industry is characterized by primarily closed intra-firm flows. At 
the same time the knowledge dissemination (being cited in forward citations) 
processes tend to be more inter-firm, which points at the relative strategic 
importance of knowledge generated by the firms in the Netherlands in this sector. 19 
 
 
Just the opposite situation can be seen in the „Chemistry excluding Pharmacy‟, 
„Instruments‟, and in the „Computers and Office Machines‟ industries. Firms in the 
Netherlands in these industries tend to use much of the knowledge created by other 
firms, while own recent innovative knowledge is more likely to be disseminated 
inside the same company. 
 
Analyzing the relative positioning of different industries depending on their attitude 
towards inter-firm knowledge spillovers allows us to make certain implications 
about the necessity of measures to stimulate R&D cooperation, as well as better 
knowledge dissemination and utilization. For example, it is preferred that the 
regulator proposes more R&D cooperation stimulating policy towards the industries 
with less intensive inter-firm knowledge spillovers, and employs less regulation in 
the industries where such spillovers are stronger and create more natural incentives 
for firms to cooperate in R&D. 
 
We consider knowledge spillovers as a source of the positive externalities 
determining the firms‟ incentives to cooperate in research and development. From 
the social planner‟s point of view, it is desirable to promote R&D cooperation, since 
it increases the efficiency of R&D, output and social welfare (d‟Aspremont and 
Jacquemin, 1988). Under conditions of stronger knowledge spillovers, innovative 
firms have more incentives to engage in R&D cooperation. For a policymaker 
whose goal is to induce R&D cooperation, it is important to balance the market 
incentives, created by stronger knowledge spillovers, and the regulative incentives. 
Once the special feature of the industry is determined, such as the likelihood of 
inter- or intra-firm spillovers and the likelihood of inter-industry knowledge 
exchange, we obtain an understanding of the general knowledge spillovers intensity. 
 
The general guidelines for the regulator, derived from our study, can be summarized 
by observing the relative positioning maps along the horizontal axis. The industries 
in the right quadrants appear to be more oriented towards intra-firm knowledge 
spillovers, thus there are rationales for stimulating the R&D cooperation among the 
firms in these industries. On the other hand, the industries situated in the left 
quadrants, operate under conditions of stronger knowledge spillovers, and there are 
market incentives which drive the companies towards more cooperation. The 
regulator in this case can stand on less intrusive positions, observing the „natural‟ 20 
 
 
tendencies towards cooperation and maybe stimulating only the most interesting 
joint R&D projects and/or alliances. 
 
Steurs (1995) and Bernstein and Nadiri (1988) point out that inter-industry 
cooperation is more favorable for increasing the R&D investment and welfare than 
intra-industry cooperation. Hence, stimulating the inter-industry R&D cooperation 
among the firms gives a better positive effect than stimulating the intra-industry 
alliances. Such regulating measures will bring their best results if applied in the 
industrial sectors located in the upper quadrants of our maps, because knowledge 
spillovers and the corresponding natural incentives to cooperate in those industries 
are weaker. 
 
Concluding this discussion, we bring up an argument that public authorities should 
use a differentiated approach to the regulation of R&D activities by firms in 
different industries. There are market-driven incentives which induce firms‟ 
cooperation; thus it is possible for a regulator to use these incentives in combination 
with particular regulatory measures to achieve desired effects whether it is the 
higher R&D investment or better knowledge diffusion in the economy. The major 
outcome of such a successful policy will eventually surface in faster economic 
growth. 
 
Finally, in the ideal scenario it is desirable to have a balanced picture of knowledge 
utilization and knowledge dissemination. The regulatory measures, which stimulate 
R&D cooperation, should take into account the type of knowledge flows prevailing 
in a particular industry. In industries with weak outward knowledge flows it is 
preferable to favor the joint R&D efforts, which are directed at better dissemination 
of knowledge produced by firms in the Netherlands. In the opposite situation (weak 
inward knowledge spillovers) attention should be paid to stimulating better 
knowledge utilization and improving the absorption capacity of enterprises in the 
Netherlands.  21 
 
 
5. Appendix: Complementary log-log Model for Patent Citations 
 
The pooled dataset contains a list of citation pairs, which were made in the granted 
patents. Thus, if we consider the probability of a citation to occur in patent pairs 
from our dataset, it is equal to 1. Within this population, we select several other sub-
events, for example „the citation is made in the citing patent coming from industry 
A‟. The complementary log-log model is specified as: 
 
'' P( 1) ( ) 1 exp( exp( )) i i i y F x x       , 1,2,.., in = ,  
 
where n is the number of observations (for details see Plasmans, 2006). In our case 
we have: 
 
1 2 3 4 ' i i i i i i x Const SameFirm SameIndustry Year CitationLag             . 
 
The dependent variable Yi is an indicator that the patent citation is made in the 
patent belonging to a particular industry. It is also known that the estimated 
coefficients of this type of model do not give the value of the marginal effect of the 
independent variable. The marginal effect for an independent variable is calculated 
as the product of the corresponding equation coefficient and the value of the density 
function calculated at the means of regressors: 
 
'














,  1,2,.., in  ,  1,2,., jk  , 
 
where 
' ' ' ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) exp( exp( )) i i i f x x x      is the complementary log-log density 
function calculated at the mean of the estimated structural part of the model.  
 
For a binary independent variable b, the marginal effect (also called slope) is 
calculated as:  ** { 1| , 1} { 1| , 0} P Y x b P Y x b      . However, Greene (1993, p. 
878) indicates that „simply taking the derivative with respect to the binary variable 
as if it were continuous provides an approximation that is often surprisingly 
accurate‟. Thus, we calculate the slopes for the binary independent variables in our 
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